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Abstract
This chapter gives an overview of some key themes in the early theories of sense perception. 
It covers early Greek theories (in particular those of the so-called Presocratics), Plato, Aristotle, 
and the early Peripatetics (Theophrastus and Strato). The comments on these first attempts at 
theorising senses come to us through the filter of Peripatetic reporting, which can be a challenge 
to their interpretation. In addition, it is argued that one can, to a degree, detect an increasing 
sophistication in the theoretical reasoning on the mechanism of sense perception. Finally, where 
possible, the chapter questions the standard hierarchy of the senses and highlights unusual cases 
of multisensory observations. The chapter provides the intellectual background for underpin-
ning sensory studies of the ancient world, not just archaeology.
Introduction
The first attempts at a theoretical understanding of the senses are recorded among the early 
Greek thinkers in the sixth and fifth centuries bce. Among a flurry of rationalistic thought 
experiments, broad theories about the workings of the cosmos soon turned their gaze to the 
interaction between humans and their environment, between ensouled sentient beings and the 
animals, plants, and ‘dead’ objects around them. These early attempts at clarifying and explaining 
how humans see, hear, smell, taste, and touch anything not only show what a rational perspective 
can do, but also offer an intriguing glimpse of the ambition to reach a generalised understanding 
of this highly subjective experience of sensory perception.
Considered views on sensory experiences from the ancient world are among the most dif-
ficult representations to interpret: we are faced with particular challenges of complex evidence, 
a problem of access to the actual sensory affections, and the fluid and variable language across 
periods and schools of thought. Relevant material ranges from the fragments of the early Greek 
philosophers (c. 625–c. 400 bce; fragments collected in Diels and Kranz, 1959 and Laks and Most, 
2016), to Plato (428–347 bce) and Aristotle (387–322 bce), who both have quite theoretical 
perspectives and are both sources for the earlier thinkers, to the famous Hellenistic schools of 
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the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. The nature of sensory experiences themselves also poses 
special challenges. Not only are they now disembodied and distant, but the descriptive terms and 
underlying concepts are also often intricate, and we have trouble determining to what extent the 
scope of recorded instances of seeing, hearing, or smelling (by choice or by chance) coincides 
with the actual range of sensations. 
These three issues (access, language, subjectivity) perhaps suggest limited opportunities for 
reconstructing theories about sensory experiences. As serious as these limitations are to our 
inquiry, we should not consider them insurmountable obstacles to probing the question of how 
the ancients expressed their sensory experiences in a more theoretical form. In this chapter, I 
will give a selective overview of the concerted efforts to describe and explain perception in the 
writings of Greek philosophers. To do so within the context of ‘sensual culture studies’ will also 
require a focus on aspects relevant to this new field. One question we must ask is whether we 
can avoid misrepresenting the evidence or superimposing modern criteria. I will deal with this 
methodological challenge intermittently since it is of wider significance for the volume as a 
whole, but first I will tackle a more fundamental point.
The focus on the Greeks as the start of the ‘Western Tradition’ in this chapter might seem 
incongruous with the aims of ‘sensual culture studies’: the ancient Western tradition generally 
represents precisely those traditional aspects which this new trend is reacting against (Day, 2013). 
On the face of it, the evidence is indeed based on such positions as the body–mind division, 
the five senses as paradigmatic, and a preference for the sense of sight. But on closer inspec-
tion we will find things are not quite that simple, and that we can make certain qualifications. 
While many sources seem to adhere to (some form of) the body–mind division, assume the five 
senses as standard, and stipulate the primacy of sight, we also find a few divergent views as well 
as intriguing signs of aesthetic, subjective, and qualitative evaluations of how physical objects 
affect the senses. The chapter falls into four thematic sections: a general account of the various 
observations on perceptions; an analysis of the significant evidence for principles of explanation; 
some novel aspects of sense perception; and an epilogue with the broader implications of this 
new approach.
Making sense of the sensorium
The literature of the Archaic period of ancient Greece (750–480 bce) is typically pre-scientific 
in its description of sensory experiences: there is no causal reasoning, no attempt at building 
a theoretical system, nor does it separate out the individual sense domains. But there are some 
intriguing signs of multisensory observations. Homer’s descriptions of war, conflict, and fam-
ily life tell us a lot about the various sensory impressions, without causal explanations. These 
and other writings on war scenes and domestic events reveal a rich palette of colours, odours, 
flavours, and tactile moments: red and warm blood; noisy and physical collisions; the smell of 
burning wood, meat, and flesh—these all contribute to the tumultuous atmosphere and quotid-
ian impressions of the era. The mode of expression, however, is usually non-theoretical, even if 
literary metaphor allows for going beyond sensory experience. 
By contrast, early Greek philosophers proposed detailed and highly theoretical constructs to 
explain perception (I refrain from using the term ‘Presocratics’, see Laks and Most, 2016). They 
characteristically express a more empirical outlook and rational aspirations to explain. Important 
thematic issues that dominate the debate on the senses were their hierarchy, their mechanism, and 
their reliability. The hierarchy is initially not broached explicitly (I will come back to this), but 
resolved in clear terms by Aristotle and then canonised. The mechanisms they favour make use 
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of two crucial notions: contact and compatibility (Baltussen, 2015). In other words, perception 
is almost without exception the result of direct contact and assumes a certain affinity between 
sense organ and its particular object (eyes and images; ears and sounds; nose and odours, etc.). 
The cause for the affinity is never properly explained, but it is often a matter of ‘fitting’. The 
claim that only compatible stimuli are registered by the appropriate sense must mean that they 
assume that our senses are assailed by various stimuli all the time, which are not registered (some 
may enter but remain undetected, as Theophrastus notes at On sense perception 7). 
Aristotle’s investigation into the deeper meaning of reality (a work now known as Metaphysics, 
though he called it ‘first philosophy’) opens with the claim that all humans want to know and 
consider sight the most important sense organ (Metaphysics A, 980a21–27). Modern linguists 
have argued that the link between seeing and understanding is embedded in the Greek lan-
guage, from the roots of special verbs (Gr. ϝειδ-/ϝιδ-/ϝοιδ-) to their later usage, so that verbs 
‘know’ and ‘understand’, such as εἴδω, incorporate the same root.1 One may speculate that 
hearing came second on account of its complementary role to sight. For example, seeing an 
orator perform (facial expressions, gesticulations) is crucially aided by hearing what an orator 
says. Only together will sight and sound convey the full impact of his message. In this sense the 
primacy of sight and hearing would seem determined by pragmatic, not ideological reasons. For 
philosophers the matter relates more to precision: sight offers the greatest degree of detail in the 
information it provides, while hearing is closely related to words and meaning. Thus, visual and 
semantic accuracy seems the main reason for their important status.
A general pattern among early thinkers relates to their basic explanatory principle, which 
played a role in their wider study of nature and humanity (clarified in detail in Baltussen, 2015). 
Our main source for the earliest views on sense perception (and sense objects), Theophrastus’ 
On sense perception (De Sensu, short DS), sums up the basic principles of explanation as being 
of two kinds (DS 1–2) to do with the relation between organ and object: perception works by 
similarity (Empedocles, c. 495–430 bce) or by contrast (Anaxagoras, c. 500–c. 425 bce).2 In this 
Theophrastus no doubt follows Aristotle, who also uses Empedocles and Anaxagoras to create 
two types to clarify the soul’s role (On the soul 416a29). This convenient dichotomy is imposed 
on the earlier theories and suggests that Empedocles and Anaxagoras framed the causes and 
mechanisms of the senses with one fundamental principle. But the model is rather reduction-
ist, and while convenient, receives some qualifying corrections in the later parts of the DS. For 
example, Theophrastus reveals that not all earlier thinkers fit the dual causes of similarity and 
dissimilarity, since individuals such as Alcmaeon (c. 500 bce) and Clidemus (c. 475 bce) seem 
to have been ‘appended’ to Empedocles and Anaxagoras respectively (DS 25–26 and DS 38) 
neither of whom made a clear claim for or against any principle. Moreover, the fact that the 
material is mediated via Peripatetic paraphrase should put us on our guard for possible distor-
tions. But overall, we get a fairly good impression of the detailed accounts of the early Greek 
philosophers and their efforts to provide a theoretical grounding for the workings of sense per-
ception. Philosophical, literary, and medical writers all contribute something on this topic, but 
that would require a much broader study than the present scope allows.
The terminology they used reflects a general perspective on perceptive processes. Terms like 
aisthêsis, normally translated ‘sense perception’, offer an added affective aspect, which we may 
render as ‘awareness, feeling’. The word is post-Homeric and its cognate verb is aisthanesthai 
(Solmsen, 1961; Kahn, 1966). Similarly, the nouns pathos and pathêma capture a wide range of 
experiential affects which are not so easily translated into English: ‘experience, feeling’ are pos-
sible translations, but so are ‘pain’ and ‘affect’. The various points the early Greek thinkers raised 
also include the relation between perception and understanding (e.g. reliability of the senses, see 
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later), the ‘attunement’ between object and perceiver, and the role of pleasure and pain in the 
process of perception.
A further point of interest is that most Greek philosophers agree that perception is ‘non-
rational’, that is to say, the impact of the object on the observer happens mechanically (without 
intention or agency). This is pertinent for the question when exactly the perceptive moment 
occurs and how and where this information is processed. The question leads to the search for 
a central sensory faculty which synthesises and interprets incoming stimuli. But we find little on 
this question, at least explicitly, until Plato in the fourth century bce (e.g. Theaetetus 184d), with 
the possible exception of Clidemus, who wanted sounds to be sent on (diapempein) to the mind 
for judgement (krinein, DS 38) or the philosopher-physician Alcmaeon (c. 510–c. 450 bce), who 
is the first to hold the exceptional view that the brain is the centre of sensation: ‘all the senses 
are connected in some way to the brain’ (DS 26; Aristotle, Inquiry into Animals 495b6, 516a8). 
Aristotle addresses the point explicitly.
Among the writings known to us, but not all extant, many concern physiological phenom-
ena associated with sensory experiences, such as emotions, sleeping, dreaming (Aristotle); sweat-
ing, dizziness, and fatigue (Theophrastus; Diogenes Laertius 5. 44, see later), which include all 
kinds of hints about the multisensory aspects of these bodily experiences. Typically, emotions 
in the sense of anger, fear, joy, and sadness are often discussed in the context of rhetoric, since 
they perform primarily a social function, in the context of the multisensory human experience 
described earlier. Thus, Aristotle discusses the emotions in Rhetoric Book 2 under deliberative 
oratory in order to ‘put his hearers in the right frame of mind’ (2.1, 1377b20–25). In rhetoric 
and history these were considered essential in both conveying and receiving the message. The 
historian Polybius (2nd c. bce) declared the eyes and ears crucial for historical reporting and 
describes them as ‘most accurate and truthful’ (Histories 12.27.12; 28a.3–5).
Five senses?
As to the number of senses, Aristotle may well be responsible for determining that five senses 
can serve as sufficient for capturing our sensory capabilities (Sorabji, 1971). As late as the sixth 
century ce, Platonist commentators assumed that he adhered to a set of five senses and no more 
(e.g. Prisician of Lydia, Paraphrase of Theophrastus’ Discourse on the Soul 1.42 Bywater: ‘Aristotle 
believes that there are no more senses because of the fact that all things are perceptible by us’). 
But as I indicated earlier, when he and Theophrastus summarise the views of their predecessors, 
they are imposing a hierarchy which partly misrepresents the views of their predecessors. It is 
especially in Theophrastus’ reports that we can find traces of a divergent hierarchy in some of the 
earlier Greek thinkers. For instance, he reports that Alcmaeon spoke of the senses individually, 
and Theophrastus opens with hearing, then smelling and tasting (DS 25), and only then discusses 
the eyes and seeing. While this latter move may be a deliberate rearrangement (e.g. to leave the 
most important to last), Alcmaeon also comments on the sense organs in some detail, identifying 
the transparent (or ‘gleaming’, τῷ στίλβοντι) of the eye as crucial for the process, and remarks 
that the tongue discerns tastes because it is ‘warm and soft’, hence able to ‘dissolve [substances] 
with its heat’; last but not least, ‘because of its loose and yielding texture it readily receives and 
transmits [savours]’ (DS 25). While Alcmaeon apparently said nothing on touch, he clearly was 
aware of the tactile dimension of taste (‘loose and yielding’) and made good use of it. 
Smell is an intriguing and enigmatic sense. In a very Homeric vein, Heraclitus (fl. 500 bce) 
is supposed to have claimed that ‘souls have [a sense of] smell in Hades’ (fr. 111 Kahn = 22B98 
DK3). His concern about what happens to us after death is certainly a reasonable one, if only to 
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show that sense perception is recognised as a sign of life—implying that the soul is in an after-
life. For Diogenes of Apollonia (fifth c. bce) Theophrastus focuses on smell first and foremost, 
probably because Diogenes’ primary (physical) cause for many perceptive processes is air (DS 
46). As a result, the report uses the sequence hearing–sight–taste; touch is not mentioned (for 
details, see Baltussen, 2000, pp.178–185). The rigour of the model is also evident in the fact that 
Theophrastus makes it clear when any of the predecessors omitted to comment on one of the 
five senses. He saw such an omission as a flaw, thereby imposing the need for an account which 
included all five of the senses. These examples strongly suggest that the Aristotelian hierarchy of 
the senses was influential but that it cannot be taken for granted in earlier philosophers.
Perception and thought
Another issue of general import is the link between perceiving and thinking (Caston, 2015). 
The earlier thinkers had trouble providing a solid foundation for knowledge, while they under-
stood there was a close relationship between perception and thought. Anaxagoras claimed ‘through 
the weakness of the sense-perceptions, we cannot judge truth’ (B21 DK). Both Aristotle and 
Theophrastus inform us that this link was a recurrent item in early discussions. Compared to the 
influential Cartesian paradigm of a strict body–mind division in modern times, their remarks sug-
gest that the early thinkers inquired whether there was some kind of deeper connection between 
body and mind, which might even lead to psychosomatic effects. Aristotle criticised Parmenides 
for declaring perceiving and thinking identical (Aristotle Metaphysics IV. 5; similar Theophrastus 
DS 4). Moreover, Empedocles is said to have made thought most perfect in the blood, because the 
blood contains the most perfect blend of the four elements (DS 10 = 31B107 DK). Theophrastus 
cannot accept this view, since, according to him, some animals are bloodless which would imply 
they do not think (DS 23). In all these cases the mental and physical are closely connected.
Individual senses
When we now consider specific sense organs and how their mechanism and effects are expressed, 
we should perhaps differentiate between the Aristotelian exemplar and what the evidence tells 
us about views diverging from this model. The earliest thinkers dealt with the functions of the 
senses on the basis of everyday observation. The sixth and fifth century philosophers formulated 
bold speculations as to how we should explain processes which were assumed to operate below 
the perceptive level (Beare, 1992, pp.4–5; Lloyd, 1973, pp.8–15). The importance of sight and 
hearing was already mentioned. It is significant that Theophrastus, our most important source 
for pre-Aristotelian theories of perception, only deals with sight and hearing for many of the 
early thinkers. It would seem that his criterion for a good theory, consistency in explanations 
offered (DS 13, 15, 18, 49, 51, 59, 92; cf. On odours 64) (on consistency, see Baltussen, 2000, 
pp.25, 168f., 202–204), leads him to shorten his account, once he finds the relevant evidence, 
thus foregoing a comprehensive account of the details. In the case of Democritus (c. 480–430 
bce) he will not go beyond the explanation for sight and hearing, commenting that ‘for our 
other senses, his treatment hardly differs from that of most others’ (DS 57; ‘most others’, see DS 
1–23). Democritus’ keen interest in perception is clear from titles of writings which consider 
colours, tastes, and perception in individual works (68A5f-h DK).
For the mechanics of vision, two main ideas are favoured before Aristotle (Theophrastus, DS 
1): either effluences come from the objects (intromission, e.g. Empedocles) or the eye reaches 
out for objects (extramission; e.g. ‘visual rays’ in Plato). Given the speculative nature of their 
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theories, early thinkers like to use similes and analogies. Thus, Empedocles employs the simile of 
the lantern (31B100) to elucidate his explanation of vision: light shining out into the world to 
establish contact (on this passage see also Sedley, 1992 and Ierodiakonou, 2005). He also makes 
everything (even soul) consist of the four basic elements, and ‘symmetrical’ effluences (aporroai) 
from bodies to fit into pores (poroi) of their corresponding organs, thus explaining how sense 
objects relate to the right organ, e.g. fire particles (probably white objects) are perceived by the 
fire in the eye (31B109 DK; Beare, 1992, pp.4–5). He is also keen to point out that that two eyes 
still produce one image (31B101 DK). Problematic is Democritus’ claim that images (deikela) 
retained the whole size and shape of objects so that Theophrastus can rightfully rebuke him for 
omitting to explain how they then fit into the eye. Clearly these suggestions are a blend of bold 
speculation and sound observation. The increased analytical perspective seems to deflect from 
making comments on multisensory experiences.
Other sense organs are less well served by the evidence, although hearing gets considerable 
attention. It is explained as a process by which air hits upon something solid. Empirically it made 
sense to assume, as Empedocles did, that solid materials can resound from impact: after all, we 
can ‘feel’ sound as the reverberations in the air and in objects as well as in our bodies. According 
to Empedocles, the inside of the ear resounds ‘like a bell’ (kôdôn, 31B99 DK) (for this term, 
see Baltussen, 2006). Smelling is, according to most, connected to breathing:Empedocles links 
it directly to breathing (31B102), while Diogenes of Apollonia assumes a special relation to the 
brain. For the other thinkers, Theophrastus does not provide much information. For taste, they 
seem to focus mostly on individual flavours rather than give a general explanation (see Rudolph, 
2018). Theophrastus even combines Democritus and Plato in a separate discussion of Causes of 
Plants 6, juxtaposing and comparing their accounts as if they offer two contrasting types on the 
opposites ends of a scale. 
The question of reliable perceptions is central for philosophical inquiry, given its importance 
for attaining secure knowledge. This type of question was a much-advanced one compared to 
the Homeric outlook because it showed an awareness of the possibility that perceptions might 
not be trustworthy. Parmenides (c. 550 bce) was the first to declare the senses unreliable (28B7 
DK), radically rejecting an empirical approach to learn about the world. His emphasis on logical 
thought (28B8 DK) led to strong doubts about the veridical status of sense impressions. Some 
thinkers after him rehabilitated the senses, on the condition that they are judged by the mind 
(Empedocles 31B3 DK; Heraclitus 22B55, 107 DK). In broad outlook Empedocles was less pes-
simistic than the sceptical rationalists (31B3):
and do not hold any [percept of] sight higher in credibility than (those) according to hear-
ing, nor (set) the loud-sounding hearing above the evidence of the tongue (taste); nor refuse 
credence at all to any of the other limbs where there exists a path for perception, but use 
whatever way of perception makes each thing clear.
(tr. Freeman, 1946, modified)
This ongoing debate on the reliability of the senses was informed by a detailed analysis of the 
senses (aisthêseis) and their objects (aisthêta). Empedocles already distinguished between what 
can be understood by the mind and what with the sense organs. When he speaks of the two 
‘binding forces’ of the universe, Hate and Love (i.e. separation and attraction), he exclaims in 
enigmatic fashion: ‘Observe her with your mind, and do not sit with wondering eyes!’ 
But Democritus added another level of complexity, expressing a sceptical view about per-
ceived objects and their underlying ‘truth’. He famously claimed that the labels we use to 
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describe our impressions, like ‘white’ or ‘sweet’, are merely conventional. Hence his analysis 
derived these are ‘secondary’ qualities derived from the primary qualities of the atoms and the 
void (68B9-10 DK). Adding this speculative layer of the world meant that Democritus separated 
perceived reality from true reality, the atoms: further subdivision of matter was not possible 
(they are atomos, ‘uncuttable’ or ‘indivisible’). Interestingly, a passage in a handbook of philoso-
phy dated to the early Roman empire (Aëtius’ Placita IV.10, 4 [Diels, 1879, p. 399] = A115 DK) 
suggests that he believed some sense objects escape our notice (lanthanein). While Beare (1992, 
pp.206–207) is not convinced that this text should be read in this way, it shows that this kind of 
question (is there full coverage of sensible objects?) was not unknown to early Greek thinkers.
Plato’s metaphysical focus
Plato gave perception a very limited role in his philosophical theory, often voicing strong reser-
vations about its value for acquiring knowledge (Theaetetus 186d; Phaedo 66-68, 73–76; Republic 
476; 523–524). His emphasis is on limitations, not on total lack of reliability, and like Parmenides 
he gives rational thought the more important role of ‘interpreting’ empirical data, which are 
derived from, and reminders of, a higher metaphysical reality (Forms). Nevertheless, in his cos-
mological work Timaeus he does present a theory of perception, ingeniously synthesising exist-
ing models to create a whole new theory (e.g. using Empedocles’ four basic elements, but also 
speaking of triangles as ‘atomic’ constituents of physical objects at an unobservable level, inspired 
by Democritus). Yet in his view, sight and hearing have primarily a teleological role, i.e. they 
were intended to observe the universe and understand its order (Timaeus 45–47). 
He describes vision as a fusing of fire from the eyes (visual ray) with its like outside (Timaeus 
45b3-d2; sunaugeia, Aëtius IV. 13, 11). Hearing, taste, flavours, smells are described (touch is not 
a separate sense), as is the conventional nature of our language for them (another Democritean 
echo). Sense objects lack permanence—they are, he seems to suggest, fleeting impressions vis-
ible in the ‘receptacle’ (probably space or place). The ‘receptacle’, a rather enigmatic and much-
debated entity, ‘receives’ objects like a mirror does images. As is clear, this account contains 
several early attempts at articulating abstract notions like impermanence, space, and physical 
change.
According to Plato, the relative size and mobility of particles determine their effect on the 
senses (53b–55c). His descriptions of their impact are vivid and convey a sense of the empirical 
experience behind it: when we burn ourselves, it is caused by the sharp edges of the small trian-
gles (56a ‘when we assign the smallest body to fire, and the greatest to water, and the intermedi-
ate to air; and again, the first in point of sharpness to fire’). The soul, the agent of life and centre 
of cognition, uses the body as an instrument, so that cognition depends on the body. This means 
our soul is confused because of the sensory impressions it has to cope with (Timaeus 43b–e). 
Plato’s account falls short of describing the soul as a central synthesising entity, but then he was 
not primarily interested in the physical world.
Peripatetic perceptions
Aristotle (384–322 bce) and his successor Theophrastus (c. 371–287 bce) did not simply follow 
the existing tradition, but critically selected from, and reframed, the approaches to perception. 
And because their view is far more systematic and comprehensive, their account combines 
methodically gathered empirical evidence with complex theoretical considerations: strikingly, 
sensation (and psychology) are framed as part of physics, because they also belong to the realm of 
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motion and change (like Plato, they held that the soul is a self-mover). In their understanding of 
the world, a major dividing-line separates animals (‘ensouled beings’, empsukha) from inanimate 
objects (‘soulless’, apsukha). As a result, the former can be defined by sensation and soul (On the 
soul 433b30; 434a30, b7–8), a superior class of entity in charge of everything else in the world 
(creatures and objects). Aristotle also introduced some novel technical notions which might 
explain the changes we observe (or believe to observe) in objects. In the briefest possible terms, 
one could put it as follows (fuller summary account in Baltussen, 2000, pp.74–79):
The process of sensing involves motion(s) bridging the gap between organ and object (On 
the soul 413b21-23, cf. Physics 244b5-245a11). They start in the heart, which is the centre of 
the sensory/perceptive abilities (On sleep 456a6). In the course of perceiving, the object and 
the organ (which are potentially alike) are brought together so that in the act of perception 
these become actually alike. Aristotle had thus succeeded in combining the two principles 
existing before him (like-by-like and contrast) into one explanatory description through 
the concepts of potentiality and actuality, and the idea of a permanent substrate which 
acquires and loses qualities.
In his analysis of change he proposed to introduce the notions of potentiality and actuality (e.g., 
an acorn is potentially an oak tree) to explain developmental change. When we see change, 
Aristotle suggests, the focus should be on what kind of change it is; the perceptive process 
informs us about superficial and temporary change (e.g. a tan) and more permanent ones 
(becoming an adult). Understanding what is going on requires us to assume that there is some-
thing underlying the change that remains stable (the permanent and the passing, or as he puts 
it, the substance and its attributes). Only then will we not become confused about phenomenal 
illusions and misleading impressions; we will be able to detect what is really going on. Note how 
this model also takes care of Democritus’ concerns about ‘secondary’ qualities not representing 
the true nature of an object.
Theophrastus, successor to Aristotle 
Theophrastus adopted much of the Aristotelian theory and developed it, expanding details and 
coherence as well as exploring associated areas.4 We do not have one work informing us about 
his views on perception, but he wrote a few separate tracts, such as On Vision (περὶ ὄψεως, DL 5. 
49, not extant) and On Odours (περὶ ὀδμῶν). In addition, the Aristotelian works can assist in fill-
ing in gaps. He probably thought there existed a certain kinship between object and sense organ 
(Priscian, Paraphrase of Theophrastus’ Discourse on the Soul 15.25–26 Bywater = fr. 277B FHSG), 
but also makes use of Aristotle’s notion of the two becoming alike (potentiality actualised, ibid. 
1.3–8). In outline, his account of the individual senses is as follows. Colour is brought to the 
eye via light, because light is the activity of the transparent and the ‘vehicle’ of colour. In the 
process of vision, the disposition of the organ is of importance, as is the transparent, which is ‘its 
matter’.5 Seeing an object, i.e. perceiving colours and common features of sense objects (form, 
size, motion), occurs when the visible object reaches the eye and produces a qualitative change 
in the eye. In smelling, which can occur without breathing, the air becomes mixed and ‘in a way 
affected’ (Priscian Paraphrase 14.10-12 Bywater = fr. 277A FHSG]. Cf. Theophrastus On odours 
9; 10; 45). In hearing at least three stages can be distinguished: first a blow (a necessary element 
of the process, 16.14–15 Bywater) occurs which shapes the air near the ear (14.10–12 Bywater)6; 
next the movement is passed on through the medium of the outside air to the air inside; and 
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finally the movement is interpreted by the sensitive part of the soul. A fascinating detail con-
firming the general description given at the start relates to the role of hearing in emotional 
responses: in rhetoric hearing is closely linked to emotion (fragment preserved in Plutarch’s 
Listening to Lectures. 37-38 = fr. 293 FHSG). Taste and touch receive a separate treatment because 
of the special problem of how to understand these more direct forms of perception and their 
medium (Priscian, Paraphrase 7.20–28 Bywater = fr. 275A FHSG). 
It is clear that the mechanics of perception by now received a more comprehensive and 
sophisticated treatment. But Theophrastus’ in-depth study of particular areas is even more 
intriguing. His special interest in tastes and smells is clear from the work On odours (Eigler, 
2003), many titles in Diogenes Laertius’ list of works (5. 42–50), and the long passages in the 
botanical works, especially his discussion in On causes of plants book 6. The views he sets out in 
On odours are quite sophisticated: he knew about the close connection between tastes and smells, 
while smell depends, according to him, on a mixed nature of the sense data. The empirical origin 
of many of his observations is very obvious: for instance, he speaks about odour in plants (2), 
wine and flowers (3), perfumes (in oils) (4–6), and spices (7). He also considers degrees of inten-
sity (adjectives such as weak, pungent, sharp, fragrant, etc.) For our purposes it is of particular 
interest how, in his view, some smells can impact on humans in a serious way, and influence 
health. Theophrastus reports that ‘headache is caused by sweet marjoram spikenard and megaleion 
among costly perfumes’ (On Odours 10). Moreover, there is a gendered aspect, when he men-
tions (ibid.) that:
The best for women are myrrh-oil, megaleion, the Egyptian, sweet marjoram, and spikenard: 
for these owing to their strength and substantial character do not easily evaporate and are 
not easily made to disperse, and a lasting perfume is what women require.
Special attention is given to rose-perfume which, despite its delicate nature, seems to be able to 
overpower other odours: 
The explanation is that, being very delicate and acceptable to the sense of smell, by reason 
of its lightness it penetrates as no other can and fills up the passages of the sense, so that 
being entirely taken up and filled with it, it is unable to judge of others. 
(11)
He also refers to the sexual powers of odours in animals, in particular the goat skin (13).
Other relevant works deal with physiological phenomena such as sweat, dizziness, and fatigue. 
There is little known about earlier views on fatigue. Assuming a mind–body dichotomy of some 
kind, Anaxagoras had declared fatigue a bodily affect, sômatikon pathos, not a mental one, ou 
psukhikon (Aëtius, Opinions of the philosophers. V. 25, 2 [Diels p. 437] = 59A103 DK). Alcmaeon 
apparently commented that fatigue was one factor among several which could influence health, 
which he viewed as a balance of the basic elemental qualities (wet–dry, hot–cold, etc.; Aëtius V, 
30.1 = 24B4 DK). Theophrastus’ short works are now available in a recent edition (Fortenbaugh, 
Sharples, and Sollenberger, 2003). They reveal some interesting details about embodied experi-
ences which would qualify as multimodal perception. A few salient points may be highlighted 
here to illustrate this. 
In On Sweat (peri idrōtōn D.L. 5.44) Theophrastus sets out his views on the nature, occur-
rence, and reasons of this physiological phenomenon. In §2 he notes that ‘sweat is salty because 
what is foreign to the nature of flesh is secreted, after what is sweetest and lightest has been 
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consumed’. This claim incorporates a range of assumptions, but what immediately strikes us is 
the fact that sweat is characterised by taste (salty). In §5 he also mentions that sweat may have 
a bad odour (e.g. acidic), which he explains as the lack of ‘concoction’ (a process of reducing 
fluids resulting from heat). He also observes that bad odour occurs in sports and sexual activ-
ity (§7), and both more in adolescents than older men (no women here; §8). Temperature also 
plays a role: he distinguishes hot from cold sweat. There is a strong suspicion that this set of 
notes in 40 short paragraphs was based on a study of athletes especially, since the examples 
are as a rule about running and exercise, while at §11 the text quotes a trainer (gymnastês) 
called Diotimus, who said that ‘there are some three varieties of sweat, beginning, middling 
and ceasing’.
The short tract on dizziness (perhaps the same as peri illingôn kai skotôseôn, Diogenes Laertius 
5. 44) offers various explanations for dizziness, one of which involves ‘movement of the sight’ 
(§7). Examples of this kind include sailing (observing the movement of the waves and stars), 
looking at swings and wheels, and vertigo (looking at high or steep things). The last case is espe-
cially interesting, as it involves the notion of extramission: ‘because it happens that their sight, 
stretched out to great length, is shaken and vibrates, … moves the inside parts’ (§8). A last example 
worth citing is the claim that ‘giddiness also comes about when people look continuously at the 
same thing and fix their gaze’ (§9). These very short comments reveal an interest in physiological 
experiences which may include the senses, which is why some of these passages also show up in 
later medical texts (Sharples in Fortenbaugh, Sharples, and Sollenberger, 2003).
Last but not least, the work on fatigue (peri kopôn, Diogenes Laertius 5. 44), something which 
can be sensed more broadly in the body as well as in the sense organs. The short work offers 
a few details regarding sensory experience in exertion and possible treatment. For instance, 
that fatigue can be experienced as ‘heaviness’ (3.23) is confirmed by what modern athletes 
experience, but we know that it is caused by ‘an excess in lactic acid’, while Theophrastus 
attributes it to ‘actual increase in weight of the limbs’, understood as a result of accumulated 
fluid (Sollenberger in Fortenbaugh, Sharples, and Sollenberger 2003, p.262). The experience of 
fatigue is clearly explained in empirical terms (§4): excretion of fluid (ekkrisis) may cause pain 
or discomfort (lupê, ponos).
These three short works reveal the wider interest in bio-medical topics among Aristotle’s 
successors.7 After Theophrastus, Strato also wrote on vision, perception, and colours (Diogenes 
Laertius 5. 59). They extend the inquiry into very specific aspects of unusual physical experi-
ences which can only be described by pointing to observable behaviours and suggesting pos-
sible causes. For the latter we find occasional multimodal explanations, since at least part of the 
experience relates to a more familiar sensory affect such as temperature, weight, or motion—all 
abstract concepts not associated solely with one specific sense organ (by touching and feeling 
perhaps). Yet these accounts were taken as contributing to a satisfactory explanation, no matter 
how much they strike us as implausible. As one reviewer of their 2003 edition wrote, ‘the job of 
accommodating theory to observation looks unnatural, implausible, convoluted, and ad hoc—an 
inadequate theory is being maintained in the face of evidence that should have caused a radical 
re-think, not just a patch-up or white-wash’ (Brennan, 2004). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to present the various views and theories of perception from the 
Archaic to the Hellenistic times in order to showcase the main features of the explanations the 
Greek philosophers offered for sensory experiences. As sentient beings, the Greeks slowly devel-
oped ways to express the sensory experiences. The transition from the Archaic to the Classical 
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period is one that moves from the experiential expression of sensory impressions to a prolif-
eration of bold and speculative theories about all the senses, including fundamental principles 
underlying these. Most early theories made use of a mechanical and empirical model to explain 
human interaction with the physical world, based on analogy, which illustrates the relative sim-
plicity of their achievement. Yet the highly detailed accounts (transmitted to us via Peripatetic 
and other sources) should not be discounted: they show awareness of the richness of the sense 
data and did not refrain from incorporating them into their explanations. We also detected com-
ments which could be read as multisensory experiences, while growing sophistication led to 
highly theoretical views on mind and body, their fusion, and other types of sensorial awareness. 
Theophrastus’ reports in his On sense perception are especially valuable, because they allow us to 
tease out various hierarchies of senses in early Greek thinkers, given the hints that suggest differ-
ent hierarchies (Alcmaeon, Clidemus, Diogenes of Apollonia) and perhaps even divergence from 
the five-senses theorem of Aristotle. We also saw how occasionally philosophers showed aware-
ness of the multimodal nature of perception, for instance when Alcmaeon described tasting in 
terms of touch and temperature. The close interaction between mind and body also gave rise 
to the suspicion that the understanding of this (internal) interaction did not always adhere to a 
strict dualism, especially with regard to the link between perception and knowledge. Overall, we 
may observe that the expanding analytical perspective seems to have impeded more developed 
views on perceptions as multisensory experiences.
This rapid overview has shown how one can detect aspects of the new sensory approach in 
familiar material. It is hoped that these observations can be of use in the broader field of sensory 
archaeology, as a reflection on the interaction between humans and their environment, includ-
ing material objects. Broadly speaking, theories of perception went from the simple experiential 
views and the theoretical constructs building on these, to a far more methodical empiricism and 
detailed theoretical stance, showing how everyday observations could lead to more adequate 
explanations on what we observe and how this leads to knowledge. Aristotle pioneered this 
new stage, illustrating how the early attempts at explaining sense perception could be evaluated 
and transformed into more sophisticated and systematic theories. After Aristotle, various sensory 
phenomena make an appearance when his successors make in-depth studies of specific areas, 
such as vision, colours, and tastes. But it is the link between perception and knowledge that 
becomes the particular focus of other Hellenistic schools who became especially interested in 
epistemology.
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Notes
1 Perhaps no longer in Latin: vid- in vidēre means ‘I see’, but differs from percipere ‘perceive’ or cognoscere 
‘learn, become acquainted with’ (through perception). Today we still say ‘I see’, meaning ‘I understand’. 
The linguistic point is made by Snell, 1955, among others.
2 For the short title De sensu (= DS) see White, 2002, pp.25–26, 29. The only English translation is 
Stratton’s 1964 (1917). For recent analyses of early theories of sight, see: Clements, 2015; Rudolph, 
2015.
3 Fragments are cited by the standard edition of Diels–Kranz = DK (first ed. 1922 with many later 
reprints; I use the 17th ed. reprinted 1989 = 1958). The first number refers to the chapter of the edition 
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associated with one thinker (Heraclitus is Ch. 68), the letter ‘B’ to a presumed fragment (not a para-
phrase, which receives the letter ‘A’), and the final number refers the actual fragment in the chapter. For 
a modern study, see Watson, 2000.
4 See, for instance, Priscian Paraphrase of the Books of Theophrastus On Sense Perception, 7.20–23 Bywater): 
‘our present project is … to develop a clear statement about … the (views) of T., both if he adds anything 
beyond what Aristotle has handed down, to bring it together, and if, in raising difficulties, he offers us anything, 
to work it out as well as we can’ [italics mine; tr. FHS&G]. (This section draws directly on Baltussen, 
2000, pp.83–86.)
5 The transparent is discussed extensively, see Priscian, Paraphrase. I. 17–18, 20–21, 23, 29 [FHS&G, 278]; 
‘Simplicius’, On Aristotle ‘On the Soul’ 136.20–29 Hayduck [fr. 279 FHSG].
6 Hearing as a shaping of the air (τοῦ ἀέρου … σχηματιζομένου) is also found in the ps. Aristotelian 
On things heard 800a3–4 where it is criticised—one of the reasons to assume it is not Theophrastean 
(Gottschalk, 1968, 447–449). It plays a large part in Theophrastus’ On Music (Fr. 89 W. [fr. 716 FHSG]), 
but is not found in the DS.
7 Since Hippocrates in the mid fifth c., medical theories arose in a fruitful cross-pollination with philoso-
phy. Aristotle advocated the view that a philosopher should also be well-versed in medical matters (On 
Sense and the sensible 436a19–22; On respiration 480b26–30).
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